Abstract: One of the most important responsibilities of governments, particularly in developing countries is executing infrastructure projects. Vital need for countries to undertake these projects on one hand and the lack of financial, managerial and executive government in implementing them on the other side reveals the necessity of take advantage new policies in this regard. Public and private sector partnership (ppp) is one of the most common and widely used of these policies and tendency to them over the past two decades have been increased. But the long-term nature of the projects and the rapid changes in the market led to numerous conflicts during the executive phases, so that the studies conducted, indicate that the majority of these projects have been associated with several negotiation steps. The goal of this article is to use game theory as one of the most applied scientific methods to resolve the economic disputes and provides appropriate strategy for overcoming financial problems and prevents delays in projects implementation. The model presented in this study is a kind of dynamic game with complete information and has the highest correlation (compatibility) with the real space, considers a variety of phenomena such as private contractor who seized the opportunities, money time value, and different political costs imposed to the state. Finally, the strategies to prevent conflicts and improve the administrative process have been provided in PPP.


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