Ali Naghi Mashayekhi; SeyedAlireza Mirbagheri
Volume 19, Issue 1 , July 2015, , Pages 191-213
Abstract
Many companies are dependent on purchasing the required professional services (such as managerial, marketing, accounting, legal, and IT services) from specialist contractors. The contract between such contractors and clients forms an agency relationship, so the agency theory may be used to regulate the ...
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Many companies are dependent on purchasing the required professional services (such as managerial, marketing, accounting, legal, and IT services) from specialist contractors. The contract between such contractors and clients forms an agency relationship, so the agency theory may be used to regulate the relationship between them. However, since the abstract knowledge is the subject of exchange between the client and professional service provider and there is a knowledge asymmetry between these two parties, the application of agency theory as it is used for traditional owner-manager agency relationship is not possible for principal-professional agent relations. In this article, we expand the agency theory to be applicable in such agency relationships. We suggest that a combination of behavior-based and outcome-based contracts be employed in principal-professional agent relationships, if possible. Moreover, we discuss why it is very hard or even impossible to have a direct control over professional service contractor and to measure the outcomes of its services. We finally propose two alternative mechanisms (1-trust and self-control, and 2-indirect control) for reducing opportunistic behaviors and solving some agency problems occurring in principal-professional agent relations.
Asghar moshabaki; Zahra Alipour Darvishi
Volume 12, Issue 1 , March 2008, , Pages 257-296
Abstract
By the increasing rate of flexibility in management systems including compensation systems, it is necessary to study theoretically and understand the key variables on designation of flexible compensation systems.
Purpose – The purpose of this article is to study the ability of agency theory in explanation ...
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By the increasing rate of flexibility in management systems including compensation systems, it is necessary to study theoretically and understand the key variables on designation of flexible compensation systems.
Purpose – The purpose of this article is to study the ability of agency theory in explanation of compensation problems inrollving the cultural context and occupation features in Iranian Automotivie Induslry.
Design/methodology- In this article, a conceptual model was developed in which we examined the relation of independent variable (agency theory assumptions) and dependent variables (current structure of compensation contracts and agent's tendency to arrange this structure). this relation is interfered with moderate variables (cultural dimensions and kind of occupation). In order to test the hypothesis, two active firms in automotive industry (manufacturing and service companies) were selected for sampling. It is to be mentioned that agency theory assumptions have not been examined in Iranian Automantive ludustry.
Results –Test of hypothesis confirmed lots of agency theory assumptions. our findings showed that some of agency theory predictions are attenuated by cultural characteristics and most of time there is a significant relation between agency theory assumptions and occupation conditions. Conclusions - using agency theory assumptions with respect to cultural dimensions and
occupation dimensions and occupation conditions in drawing up of compensation contracts will improve Iranian firm’s wage and salary systems in order to reduce agency problems and the related cost.
